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Abstract 
This paper analyses the question on whether a Hercules legislator would validly propose a global 
standard, in particular, exchange of information between tax officials and those taxpayers who have a 
connection with one of the countries involved. This suggestion covers tax matters, including tax 
crimes, and is being put forward by the Global Forum. 
In recent decades, a global legal discourse has spread, but this trend has also been confronted with the 
acknowledgment that plural legalities coexist in domestic boundaries. Validity of a tax reform implies 
taking into account binding non-state and supra-state legalities. 
Individual legalities in force in a certain state are the cause of an important tension, and can result in 
important obstacles to the validity of state law, if the latter is not the product of argumentative 
interaction. The risk that such interaction does not exist is higher in the case of supra-national 
legalities, as is the case of exchange of information. 
It is herein claimed that a Hercules legislator would propose exchange of information on tax matters as 
an international standard, as long as the taxpayers’ fundamental rights as acknowledged in rule-of-law 
states are not jeopardized. It is also suggested that transitional regimes should be adopted in respect of 
some States. 
Keywords 
Taxes and Exchange of Information; International Standards; Fishing expeditions; Taxpayers' 
fundamental rights 
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1. Introduction* 
I have previously made use of a Hercules legislator in the context of tax reforms carried out by an 
external draft legislator who aimed at the validity of those tax reforms in which she or he was 
engaged.
1
 I have also contended that validity of a tax reform implies taking into account the plural 
legalities in force in a certain jurisdiction, including non-state legalities that have been recognized as 
binding by tax officials and courts.
2
 These legalities could include overlapping of taxes resulting in 
double taxation, different procedural tax rules, adoption of different accounting rules and languages in 
tax compliance duties. 
In this paper, the question is whether a Hercules legislator would validly propose a global standard, 
in particular, exchange of information between tax officials on taxpayers who have a connection with 
one of the countries
3
, and suggesting that exchange of information is to be adopted universally. This 
suggestion is being put forward by the Global Forum. In its view, “[t]he international standard, which 
was developed by the OECD in co-operation with non-OECD countries and which was endorsed by 
the G20 Finance Ministers at their Berlin Meeting in 2004 and by the UN Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax at its October 2008 Meeting, requires the exchange of information on 
request in all tax matters for the administration and enforcement of domestic tax law without regard to 
a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax purposes. It also provides for extensive 
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged”.4 
2. Plural Legalities, Global Standards, Recognition and Validity 
It is undeniable that in recent decades a global legal discourse has spread and tax reforms with global 
solutions have been adopted but this trend has also been confronted with the acknowledgment that 
plural legalities coexist in domestic boundaries. This acknowledgment is relatively recent and covers 
every legal field.
5
 Legal pluralism has been debated in respect of developing countries where sub-state 
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 Ana Paula Dourado ‘Is this is a pipe? Validity of a tax reform for a developing country’, in: Tax Law and Development 
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 See below, point 3. 
4
 OECD, Tax Co-operation 2009: Towards a Level Playing Field , 2009, available at www.oecd.org (last visited 24 
October 2012) at 8. 
5
 Jeremy Waldron, “Legal Pluralism and the Contrast Between Hart’s Jurisprudence & Fuller’s”, The Hart-Fuller Debate 
in the Twenty-First Century, ed. by Peter Cane, Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2010, at 141 et seq.; 
Alessandra Facchi, I Diritti nell’ Europa Multiculturale,Pluralismo Nomativo i Immigrazione, Editori Laterza, 4ª ed., 
Roma-Bari, 2008, at 38; Leopold Pospisil, The Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory of Law, Harper and Row, 
New York, 1971; John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?”, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 1986, n. 
24, at 1-50; Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject 
of Study”, Law & Society Review, 1973, n. 7, at 719 et seq.; Sally Engel Merry, “Legal Pluralism”, Law & Society 
Review, vol. 22, 1988, n. 5, at 870 (869-901). David Nelken, “Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural Legalities, 
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legalities of existing communities coexist with state legality, but the discussion on legal pluralism is 
likewise applicable to OECD countries, Council of Europe countries, regional integration areas such 
as the European Union and the European Economic Area, and any other country especially when 
facing important immigration movements. The global legal discourse is moving fast in tax law as well, 
and is a product of global identity, solidarity, and a sense of global fairness and unfairness, global 
human and fundamental rights.
6
 The awareness of phenomena such as tax evasion and avoidance by 
certain groups of taxpayers, the consequences of bank and tax secrecy and tax havens for each and 
every country, the importance of exchange of information on tax matters, the right to a fair hearing in 
tax litigation, information duties and the nemo tenetur se ipsum accusarem principle, are examples of 
global problems asking for global solutions and global tax standards. 
Global tax standards are in most cases proposed by international organizations, where the 
horizontal influences of different state legalities are discussed, some of them taken as best practices 
(for example, exchange of tax information on request) and recommended afterwards as a vertical 
legality (an international best practice or standard) in soft law instruments to all Member States. 
Horizontal (Member States’) and vertical (EU Law) legalities interact daily in the European Union, 
where, on the one hand the Court of Justice adopts principles that are considered to be inherent to the 
rule of law and fundamental rights in Europe, and on the other hand, Member States are required to 
adopt EU principles and concepts under the primacy principle.
 7
 
In respect of migration movements, there is a risk of reciprocal ignorance of the incoming and the 
state legalities involved that will affect recognition of rules and their binding character (I would call 
these cases blind vertical legalities). Consequences of blind vertical legalities can occur in the case of 
a state income tax that adopts a legal concept of taxpayer that corresponds to the dominant legal 
culture, and does not recognize any tax consequences to trusts; or in the case of marriage and family 
that corresponds to the dominant culture and religion within a country and does not recognize other 
types of marriages and families; or in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises constituted by 
immigrant groups organizing themselves according to the rules of their home culture and legal system 
and having therefore a dispute with the state tax officials and courts. 
Plural legalities in force in a given state are facts for my purposes in this paper and they refer to 
legalities that are recognized as binding by the authorities that apply the law (and I am adopting the 
Habermasian meaning of facts and facticities
8
). But recognition that plural legalities are in force is 
insufficient: my concerns are related to the validity of law and by it I mean legal rules that are the 
product of genuine argumentative interaction among the representatives of different legalities (again in 
the Habermasian sense
9
) both within a state and at an inter-state level, the latter being either bilateral 
or multilateral. The concept of validity of law adopted herein covers tax reforms and any global rules 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Martha-Marie Kleinhaus/Roderick A. Macdonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism”, Canadian Journal of Law & 
Society ,1997, n. 12, at 25-46;  
6
 Amartya Sen, “Identity and Violence, The Illusion of Destiny”, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2006, 
e.g. chapters 2 and 7; Boaventura Sousa Santos, “Por uma Concepção Multicultural de Direitos Humanos, Reconhecer 
para Libertar, Os Caminhos do Cosmopolitismo Multicultural”, Boaventura Sousa Santos (org.), Civilização Brasileira, 
Rio de Janeiro, 2003, at 427-551.  
7
 On legal pluralism in the European Union, see: Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, - The European Court of Justice 
and the European Economic Constitution, Oxford, Hart Publishing,1998; “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional 
Pluralism in Action”, in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, at 501-537; “A 
Constituição Plural, Constitucionalismo e União Europeia”, Principia, São João do Estoril, Cascais, 2006, capítulos I e 
IV; Koen Lenaerts, “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism”, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 
38, 1992, n. 2, at 205-263. 
8
 These concepts are therefore used here in the Habermasian sense and further discussed below: See Jürgen Habermas, 
Faktizität und Geltung, Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt-am-
Main, 1992, 2. Auflage, at 32-55. 
9
 Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität ..., cit., at 21, 32-55. 
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and standards applicable in cross-border situations and resulting from a compromise assumed under 
international law.
10
 
Individual legalities in force in a certain state are themselves the cause of an important tension, and 
can result in important obstacles to the validity of state law, including the validity of a state tax reform 
if state law is not the product of the aforementioned argumentative interaction. The risk that such 
interaction does not exist is higher in the case of supra-national legalities, as is the case of exchange of 
information designed by the OECD in Article 26 OECD Model Tax Convention and the Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters (published in 2002 by the Global Forum on 
Taxation and it containing both bilateral and multilateral drafts). 
My question is therefore whether a Hercules legislator would propose exchange of information on 
tax matters (including tax crimes) as an international standard, in the sense that exchange of 
information would be the best legal solution for every state in the world, and if so, without 
jeopardizing the taxpayers’ fundamental rights as acknowledged in rule-of-law states. For the sake of 
clarity, it is herein further contended that every tax principle and rule demanded by the rule of law and 
the rule of law itself is an international standard and therefore, international standards exist and can be 
proposed universally. However, to propose a standard as universally valid implies a previous 
assessment of utmost responsibility, especially when it is proposed by international organizations 
powerful enough to lead their members to adopt such standards. 
An international organization will have to play the Hercules legislator: it will perfectly grasp the 
tax system of a specific country, propose the best solutions for an efficient and equitable system in 
compliance with the rule of law, assess the complexity of those solutions and the consequences for the 
taxpayer and the tax administration, and in order to carry out this task it will have to deal with the 
plural legalities in force and be sure that a specific country has a constitutional system and procedural 
rules that will guarantee a genuine argumentative interaction before exchange of information is 
approved. If a parallel is drawn with abstractionism or expressionism in contemporary painting, the 
answer will be that the context will determine the style chosen by the artist and whether it is 
recognized as art. In other words, validity of exchange of information as an international standard will 
imply an assessment of the context and not be satisfied by its potential beneficial effects. 
3. The Object and Purpose of Exchange of Information  
Exchange of information will take place when it is foreseeably relevant to the correct application of 
treaty rules (minor information clause) or/and in order to carry out the administration and enforcement 
of domestic tax laws of the contracting states (major information clause). The condition of the 
“foreseeable relevance” of information exchanged was introduced in 2005, replacing the term 
“necessary” (OECD MC 1977). Previously to 2005, information was considered to be “necessary” in 
case it was relevant to correctly carry out the provisions of a convention
11
 or to implement domestic 
taxes in the contracting state requesting the information.
12
  
                                                     
10
 As a consequence, it is herein contended that the rules of recognition also have to be valid in the Habermasian sense: 
Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität..., cit., at 21, 32-55. 
11
 See Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof) Munich, of 29 April 2008, Case n.º IR 79/07, company name not disclosed (the 
taxpayer) v. Federal Central Office for Taxation (formerly Federal Tax Office) (the tax authorities): ‘In line with Article 
26 OECD MC this provision also covered spontaneous exchange of information, ‘but it required that the exchange was 
necessary for carrying out the provisions of the treaty. ... But the Exchange had to be limited to the facts that were 
necessary for enabling the Chinese authorities to tax X, such as his name, his address in China, the type and amount of 
his income. The fact that salaries are taxed with the assistance of the employer in Germany (deduction at soucre) did not 
justify naming the German employer to the foreign authorities.’ 
12
 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court (Schweizerisches Bundesgericht) has decided that ‘the behavior of X was within the 
scope of the term “tax fraud and the like” as used in Art. 26 (1) of the treaty, Schweizerisches Bundesgericht of 27 
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Both in Article 26 OECD MC and in Article 2 Model Agreement, exchange of information is not 
limited to information relating to the affairs of residents of the Contracting Parties. The scope of 
Article 26 is broader in terms of taxpayers and taxes covered by the OECD MC, because it covers 
persons not entitled to the treaty benefits, not only because of the major information clause, but also 
when the information regarding those non-entitled persons is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the 
provisions of the tax treaty. That is the case for residents of a third country, although there are limits in 
respect of exchanging information about those persons. It is admitted that the tax liability in one of the 
contracting states of a person resident in a third country provides for the necessary connection to 
legitimate exchange of information between the mentioned contracting states: for example, where 
there is income with a source in one of the contracting states regarding a resident in a third country. 
Exchange of information aims to fight tax evasion and to guarantee effective fiscal supervision and 
it is, as the other side of the coin, a condition to raise (otherwise lost) revenue, but neither of the two 
legitimates the standard per se. By providing transparency with regard to taxable events, exchange of 
information will both prevent evasion and potentially allow for a more efficient control, but this 
purpose is insufficient to justify it as an international standard, because the legitimate instruments and 
action taken by each tax administration will have to comply with the taxpayers’ rights. 
Exchange of information will create the conditions to raise revenue, but it is neither an anti-abuse 
measure, since it does not re-characterize tax facts, nor an interpretive tool counteracting tax 
avoidance. It is common sense that taxes always aim at raising revenue and therefore this purpose 
cannot guide the application of tax law by the administration.
13
 Moreover, exchange of information, as 
a standard, is a condition for a balanced allocation of taxing rights, since it will lead to transparency on 
the tax burden raised by each jurisdiction and to fair competition among the jurisdictions wanting to 
attract investment. The lack of exchange of information can jeopardize a balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between two states that have concluded a bilateral tax treaty, if a conduit company is interposed 
in a third state not exchanging tax information. This is also applicable in a multilateral relationship, 
such as the European Union or the Economic European Area, if at least one of the Member States does 
not exchange information, jeopardizing in this manner the balanced allocation of taxing rights among 
all of them. 
In bilateral relationships, if important amounts of investment are being diverted to conduit 
companies, states can react by terminating tax treaties or by introducing unilateral discriminatory tax 
measures and expanding the concept of source. It is therefore herein assumed that enforcement of 
domestic tax law in the case of cross-border situations, elimination of juridical double taxation, 
application of non- discrimination clauses and in general the design of an international tax policy by a 
state, namely whether the purpose is to achieve import or export neutrality, can only be reached if 
there is exchange of information. The lack of exchange of information is an alien that will introduce 
distortions in the approval of a tax reform including where different legalities are represented. 
Because without exchange of information, there is no effective fiscal supervision and the law 
cannot be enforced, in the European Union, the European Court of Justice accepts the lack of 
exchange of information as a valid justification for a discriminatory treatment against a third country 
or an EEA country.
14
 In contrast, the European Court of Justice presumes that the existence of a 
(Contd.)                                                                  
January 2004, Case n.º BGE 2A. 185/2003, Not disclosed (the taxpayer) v. Eidgenössische Verwaltung. The Court 
determined that there were several occasions when X, most probably tried to hide the commissions by giving incorrect 
evidence and using wrong or misleading certificates. The Court emphasized that the IRS was not obliged to provide strict 
evidence. The Court stated that it was sufficient if the suspicion of tax fraud or the like was justified. The Court held that 
such conduct constitutes “tax fraud or the like “ in the sense of Art. 26 (1) of the treaty.  
13
 Klaus Vogel & Christian Waldhoff, Grundlagen des Finanzverfassungsrechts, Sonderausgabe des Bonner Kommentars 
zum Grundgesetz (Vorbemmerkungen zu Art. 104 a bis 115 GG) Heidelberg, at 199, 309 et seq. 
14
 For example, ECJ, 18 December 2007, C-101/05 (Skatteverket v A.). 
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directive on exchange of information is a sufficient tool to assure enforcement of domestic law.
15
 Until 
the recent peer-review work by the Global Forum, the scope of exchange of information as proposed 
by Article 26 OECD MC was often limited in the bilateral conventions, because of domestic 
constraints and often led either to its non-inclusion in the bilateral conventions or to its non-
application.  
All in all, it is herein also assumed that the current international trend toward global tax 
transparency and exchange of information is the most efficient tool to counteract global aggressive tax 
planning, but it has to be questioned whether it is a valid international standard. 
4. The Assessment of Exchange of Information as a Valid Standard 
The universality of a tax standard can neither be merely justified in the interest of the international 
community, nor in the interest of state revenue, or by the prevention or combating tax evasion as a 
menacing scenario (not to be proved on a case-by-case basis), or in the interest of survival of a certain 
category of taxes (for example, corporate income tax). Each of these is too abstract to guarantee 
compliance by states involved in exchange of information with the fundamental rights of each and 
every taxpayer potentially or effectively affected by that standard. An international standard cannot be 
justified in the interest of enforcement of law either; otherwise the use of torture could be justified as a 
means of evidence to enforce criminal law as happened in the Middle Ages. 
It has to be kept in mind that information exchanged concerns taxpayers, and therefore it has to 
respect their fundamental tax rights, unless the public interest is superior to the former. It is herein 
considered that exchange of information aims at preventing and combating tax evasion and this is a 
behaviour adopted both by individual taxpayers and corporations.
16
 This behaviour occurs in a 
scenario of worldwide income tax on individuals (global and progressive personal income tax), and of 
source income tax on companies, where the major information clause covers any situations of the 
correct allocation of taxing rights and any taxpayers involved. 
It has to be verified, for example, whether and to what extent a right to be notified of an exchange 
of information procedure is foreseen in one, both or all of the tax systems involved, whether 
confidentiality will be guaranteed, whether and to what extent the statute of limitations is respected, 
whether information obtained illicitly by a tax administration can be validly used and transmitted. It 
also has to be discussed whether bilateral or multilateral exchange of information is consistent with the 
principle of separation of powers and more generally with the rule of law in a certain state or whether 
it is detached from domestic legalities. Exchange of information will not be valid, in the sense adopted 
in this paper, if it is introduced in the domestic law of an authoritarian state, as a condition to attract 
important foreign services industries, but without the necessary underlying organization for collection 
and storage of reliable data and without a guarantee of the due confidentiality.  
All of these aspects should be weighted and verified by an international tax organization and its 
members, before extending the standard on exchange of information to any country in the world. They 
should at least be part of a peer-review assessment within the Global Forum. In other words, exchange 
of information will only bring the level playing field back if the states committed to exchange 
information are rule-of-law states and are organized to collect and store reliable data in conditions of 
                                                     
15
 ECJ, 15 de May 1997, C-250/95 (Futura Participations SA and Singer v Administration des contributions).  
16
 N. Johannesen & G. Zucman, “The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown”, WP, 2012; 
J.R. Hines, and E.M. Rice, “Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109, 1995, n. 1 at 149–182; D. Dharmapala & J.R. Hines Jr., ‘Which Countries become Tax Havens’, 93 
Journal of Public Economics, 2009, at 1058; D. Dharmapala, ‘What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax 
Havens’ 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2008, at 661.  
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confidentiality. A preliminary analysis of the validity of exchange of information therefore raises 
serious doubts on its universal validity.  
5. The Global Forum and the Peer-Review Criteria 
The Global Forum is the division of the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration of the OECD that is 
heading the implementation of the “internationally agreed standard” on exchange of information as an 
answer to the call for improved tax transparency.
17
 The current international standard on exchange of 
information results from Article 26 OECD MC, Article 1 2002 OECD Model Agreement on Exchange 
of Information and its 2005 Commentary and the 2010 Protocol to the Council of Europe/OECD 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Tax Matters 
Since the G20 in its November 2008 meeting in Washington DC, and 2009 under the auspices of 
the restructured Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information, there is strong policy 
pressure in order to implement exchange of information standards, and obstacles under domestic law 
based on bank secrecy, lack of domestic interest and lack of reciprocal investigative efforts by the 
other contracting state cannot be directly invoked. The restructured Global Forum ensures that all its 
members are on an equal footing and will fully implement the standard on exchange of information 
they have committed to implement. Technically, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes is a part II programme of the OECD. 
It is a fact that treaties on exchange of information (TIEAs) have increased exponentially since 
2009. TIEAs are to be concluded with countries for which tax treaties are not considered appropriate, 
i.e., that have technically been considered to be tax havens. For example, countries, such as 
Luxembourg, that had strong bank secrecy and did not engage in information exchange until recently, 
but were never considered to be tax havens in the technical sense, did not conclude TIEAs. Their 
changing policy towards exchange of information has been dealt with under the respective DTCs.
18
  
The context of this proposed international standard, can be further understood on the webpage of 
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, where it can be 
read: “The Global Forum called together 178 delegates from 70 jurisdictions and international 
organisations on 1-2 September in Mexico to discuss progress made in implementing the international 
standards of transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, and how to respond to 
international calls to strengthen the work of the Global Forum. In the context of the need of 
governments to protect their tax bases from non compliance with their tax laws, the main objectives 
for the meeting were to: Agree on restructuring the OECD Global Forum to expand its membership 
and ensure its members participate on an equal footing; Agree on how to establish an in-depth peer 
review process to monitor and review progress made towards full and effective exchange of 
information; and identify mechanisms to speed-up the negotiation and conclusion of agreements to 
                                                     
17
 There are commitments from all of the G20 members, as well as incorporation of the standard into the UN Model Double 
Tax Convention, the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, and the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. The Global Forum is also working with the International Financial Corporation of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Financing for Development arm of the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs in order to expand its membership and to execute technical assistance programmes to build capacity for 
effective exchange of information, particularly among developing countries. The aforementioned international 
organizations are active observers at the Global Forum, participating in its meetings; the Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Information Brief, 29 October 2012, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/Journalist's%20brief%20October%202012.pdf last visited 24 October 
2012, at 2 and 7. 
18
 Luxembourg adopted the OECD mutual assistance standards by law on 31 March 2010: See A. Steichen ‘Information 
Exchange in Tax Matters: Luxembourg’s New Tax Policy’ in: A. Rust.& E. Fort (eds.), Exchange of Information and 
Bank Secrecy, 2012, at 32, 44-53; see also the case of Belgium: C. Docclo, ‘Exchange of Information’ in: A. Van De 
Vijver (ed.), The New US-Belgium Double Tax Treaty – A Belgian and EU Perspective , 2009, at 537–553.  
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exchange information and to enable developing countries to benefit from the new more cooperative 
tax environment”.19 
The strong push on exchange of information under the Global Forum and now involving 118 states 
is a result of the financial crisis of 2008, but prior to the current trend, other rules were also 
recommended by the OECD to counteract the aforementioned global tax planning: Exchange of 
information in tax matters and global fiscal transparency are being proposed on the basis of an 
international standard as drafted by the Global Forum and as a tool to counteract harmful tax 
competition as a global issue.  
This results from the OECD research and reports: lack of effective exchange of information was 
the main criterion for identifying tax practices harmful to competition
20
 in the OECD Report on 
“Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue” of 1998. The Report concerned and identified 
tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes. Tax havens were therein defined as providing for no 
or nominal income taxes, combined with other legislative or administrative features, such as minimal 
administrative and regulatory constraints (they corresponded to jurisdictions with no taxes, no 
transparency, no exchange of information and no real activity). In turn, preferential tax regimes 
provided favourable locations for holding passive income or book keeping profits. Three features were 
identified as common to tax havens and preferential tax regimes: absence of true taxes, lack of 
effective exchange of information, lack of transparency.
21
 In tax havens there was no substantive 
activity and in the case of preferential tax regimes ring fencing of benefits in order to attract non-
resident investors was a main feature.
22
 The Report was focused on income taxes, and the provision of 
financial services and tax incentives to attract investment in plant and equipment was left aside.  
Still in the same OECD Report of 1998, the OECD recommended its Member States to identify 
non-cooperative jurisdictions in domestic lists and to subject cross-border investments to or from those 
jurisdictions to a higher tax burden, either by way of controlled foreign company rules, higher tax 
rates, non-deductibility of interest paid to a taxpayer in such a jurisdiction. The Report makes 19 
recommendations, divided in three groups and aimed at improving international cooperation and 
responding to harmful tax competition: recommendations dealing with domestic legislation and 
practices (for example, introduction of controlled foreign company rules; adoption of information 
reporting rules of international transactions; access to banking information for tax purposes), 
addressing tax treaties (for example, greater and more efficient use of exchange of information) and 
recommendations to increase international cooperation in response to harmful tax practices (for 
example, publication of a list of tax havens).  
The 1998 Report, the subsequent 2001 OECD Progress Report, the Model Agreement on Exchange 
of Information on Tax Matters in 2002, by the Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes, include recommendations on the topic. These recommendations are 
soft law and not legally binding instruments, until included in international treaties.  
                                                     
19
 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/abouttheglobalforum.htm 
20
 These developments in the OECD MC resulted from the G7 Lyon Summit in 1996 where the OECD was mandated to 
produce a report on harmful tax competition. In 1998 the OECD issued the report on “Harmful tax competition: an 
emerging global issue” (hereinafter: the Report). Harmful tax competition was characterized in the Report as a worldwide 
problem and it was concluded that the lack of effective exchange of information was the main criterion for identifying tax 
practices harmful to competition: See M. Engelschalk, Article 26, in: K. Vogel & M. Lehner (eds.), DBA Kommentar, 
2008, at m.no 21; and P. Malherbe & M. Beynsberger, ‘The Year of Implementation of the Standards?’ in: Rust A.& Fort 
E. (eds), Exchange of Information and Bank Secrecy, 2012, at 122-124.  
21
 Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue, OECD Report, 1998, at 23-25. 
22
 Harmful Tax Competition..., cit., at 24; S.C. Ruchelman & S. Shapiro ‘Exchange of Information’, 30 Intertax, 2002, at 
409. 
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What the legal implication of exchange of information as an international standard is then has to be 
discussed, why it is targeted at all states, and to what extent states are free to adopt it or not. In this 
context, bilateral or multilateral exchange of information is an example of a more general issue 
involving the recognition and validity of global standards and new (tax) standards to be adopted in 
cross-border situations. 
In a legal perspective, the obligation to exchange of information under a (tax) treaty and even if 
subject to peer review by the Global Forum is insufficient to create a level playing field and a valid 
international standard. In fact, neither a provision on exchange of information included in an 
international treaty nor the action by the Global Forum is able to harmonize domestic legislation and 
therefore they cannot themselves create a domestic legal basis for correctly implementing a request for 
exchange of information.  
The Global Forum has acknowledged that the domestic legal basis is a condition to implement the 
international standard on exchange of information, by submitting members to a peer-review procedure 
aimed at verifying exchange of information in practice.
23
 According to the Global Forum, the standard 
requires in each member State the existence of mechanisms for exchange of information upon request; 
the availability of reliable information, where bank, ownership, identity and accounting information 
are the most relevant; and powers to obtain and provide such information in response to a specific 
request in a timely manner; and respect for safeguards and limitations and strict confidentiality rules 
for information exchanged.
24
 Whether the standard is observed or not is to be checked in the peer-
review phases and all members are subject to peer-review.  
Both ex-tax havens members of the Global Forum signing TIEAs and all other members of the 
Global Forum are submitting themselves to peer-review by the Global Forum. Part of the assessment 
by the Global Forum on whether the standard is being accomplished lies in quantification criteria, 
namely whether a member has concluded at least 12 TIEAs. Where a substantial number of the TIEAs 
have been concluded with other ex-tax havens, the assessment should be negative and exchange of 
information ineffective, because easily manipulated by the Member States of the Global Forum. 
6. Assessment of Validity of Exchange of Information as an International Standard 
6.1. Ex-Ante, Ex-post Assessment 
The current international standard on exchange of information requires exchange of information on 
request (see Protocol on Exchange of Information to the Austria-Slovenia tax treaty)
25
, in the case of 
foreseeable relevance to the tax administration without regard to the domestic interest of the requested 
State, bank secrecy
26
 or dual criminality.
27
 The standard is limited to information exchange on request 
because that corresponds to the scope of TIEAs. 
                                                     
23
 See the description of the peer-review mechanisms and the description of and comments on the Mauritius experience in: 
P. Malherbe & M. Beynsberger, cit., at 140-150. 
24
 See http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3746,en_21571361_43854757_44200609_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
25
 Protocol dated 7 October 2011. 
26
 M.nos 19.10 and 19.11 OECD MC on Art. 26 (5). 
27
 P. Malherbe & M. Beynsberger, cit., at 131; Switzerland traditionally had a different approach: J. Malherbe, ‘Entraide 
Judiciaire Pénale et Délits Fiscaux: Évolution du Droit Suisse’, Journal de Droit Fiscal, 1982, at 358 et seq. See M. F. 
Huber M. F. & F. Duss, Switzerland: Recent Developments in International Tax Law – Part 1’ Bulletin for International 
Taxation, 2009, at 567.  
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Article 26 para. 2 OECD MC and Article 8 Model Treaty on Exchange of Information provide for 
confidentiality rules.
28
 Moreover, Article 26 para. 3, together with paras. 4 and 5 OECD MC, draws 
the limits to the obligation to supply information. They complement para. 1 and the scope of exchange 
of information. The legal technique used to draw the scope and corresponding limits of exchange of 
information is as follows: Para. 3 a. and b. refers to domestic limits (administrative measures are to be 
taken within the framework of domestic laws and administrative practice and the supply of 
information has to be in compliance with domestic legality). Para. 3 c. (disclosure of trade or 
professional secrets) already follows from general international public law principles (ordre public). 
Paras. 4 and 5
29
 in turn limit the scope of para. 3, since they enumerate what cannot be included in 
(limited by) para. 3. 
The validity of exchange of information as an international standard can be assessed on the basis of 
the legal criteria ruling the aforementioned exchange of information on request, as well as on the basis 
of the criteria underlying the peer review phases and mentioned above. The relevant criteria for the 
validity assessment are the existence of foreseeable relevance and consequent prohibition of “fishing 
expeditions”; respect for domestic safeguards and limits; the prohibition of disclosure of trade or 
professional secrets; the existence of reliable data, and strict confidentiality rules.  
However, the respect for safeguards and limitations is a formal and ultimately void criterion, 
because as such it does not require the existence of any or specific domestic safeguards and 
limitations. It only requires a non-discriminatory treatment of cross-border situations, taking into 
account the existing domestic safeguards and limitations. A related issue is whether information 
obtained illicitly can be validly used either in domestic or cross-border situations. Article 26 OECD 
MC does not contain any prohibition in this respect, as long as para. 2 is respected, and a prohibition 
of use being made of such evidence in the requesting contracting state depends on the latter state’s 
domestic law.
30
 An international standard on exchange of information that does not prohibit the use of 
illicitly obtained data will contribute to and stimulate a global market where those data can be sold and 
bought, and where the confidentiality rules will not be observed.  
The concept of validity of law requires a communicative discourse (separation of powers and 
different legalities represented), safeguards of fundamental taxpayers’ rights and related limitations on 
the activity of administration and courts, a clear prohibition of use of illicitly obtained data and 
absence of corruption, among other things. None of these are conditions to become a Member of the 
Global Forum (or of the Council of Europe or OECD); they are not criteria subject to peer review 
either. Furthermore, validity of exchange of information as a standard also has to be assessed taking 
                                                     
28
 “Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained 
under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the 
determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such persons or 
authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court 
proceedings or in judicial decisions.” The 2012 update of Article 26 para. 2 adds that “Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
information received by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such 
other purposes under the laws of both States and the competent authority of the supplying State authorises such use.” 
29
 Article 26 (4): If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, the other Contracting 
State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain the requested information, even though that other State may 
not need such information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding sentenced is subject to the 
limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such limitations be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to 
supply information solely because it has no interest in such information. 
 Article 26 (5): In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to 
supply information solely because the information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or person acting 
in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership interest in a person.  
30
 Concurring, M. Engelschalk, cit., at m.no 98. 
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into account what is going to happen when it is effectively used by the contracting states in their 
bilateral or multilateral relations - a law-in-action approach. 
Violation of taxpayers’ fundamental rights (as would be required by the rule of law) can occur 
when either the requesting or the requested state (or both) do not comply with the rule of law, but 
when asking for information or providing it, a contracting state is not obliged to check if the other 
contracting party will comply with the rule of law. 
In this context, exchange of information will neither reach neutral results nor accomplish a level 
playing field. Besides, tax relationships still strongly lie either in bilateral or in regional relations and 
the standard will be interpreted in different ways. International organizations suggesting exchange of 
information as an international standard ought to assess its validity from a joint law-in-the-books and 
law-in-action perspective, taking into account what may happen after it becomes legally binding and 
enters into force. In the case of multilateral treaties such as the OECD/Council of Europe Multilateral 
Treaty on Exchange of Information (on request), and in the case of multilateral automatic exchange of 
information (which is not yet an international standard but may become one in the near future), the 
risk of violation of taxpayers’ rights is proportionally higher.  
All in all, except for the foreseeable relevance of the request and confidentiality of the information 
exchanged, no minimum legal standard concerning taxpayers’ rights in domestic legal systems is 
required as a condition for bilateral or multilateral exchange of information, and it is not certain that 
both legal requirements will be duly observed by the contracting states. 
6.2. Foreseeable Relevance 
It is assumed in this paper that the international standard on exchange of information has developed in 
the direction of intensifying and broadening the scope and reducing domestic obstacles to an effective 
exchange of information, accommodating the best practices developed among some of the contracting 
states. Among those facilitating conditions are the ones that are to be invoked by the requesting state 
when asking for information. For example, in 2005, the condition of “necessity” under Article 26 para. 
1 was changed to “foreseeable relevance”, and became consistent with Article 1 Model Agreement on 
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters. The standard of foreseeable relevance had also been adopted 
by the Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters of 1985 (Article 4 para. 1). 
As the criterion has been changed from necessity to foreseeable relevance, any (detailed enough) 
request to confirm the origin, amount and beneficial owner of foreign-source income, for example, can 
justify a request by a contracting state, even if in the end the data provided do not lead to a different 
tax result (what matters is an a-priori assessment). Information requested is foreseeably relevant, if it 
is “of some demonstrable benefit or assistance to the other country”31, and as long as it identifies the 
taxpayers and tax-relevant situations (i.e., as long as it is not a ‘fishing expedition’).32 It has also been 
argued that ‘foreseeably relevant information’ stems from a ‘probably appropriate request’.33 
‘Probably appropriate’ allows for the a-priori assessment by the requesting State and leaves some 
margin to the requested State, preventing a ‘fishing expedition’.34According to the Commentary 4 on 
Article 1, “The Agreement uses the standard of foreseeable relevance in order to ensure that 
                                                     
31
 Adrian J. Sawyer, ‘Tax Havens “Coming in from the Cold”: A Sign of Changing Times?’ BFIT November, 2010, at 549. 
32
 It is not necessary, however, that before making its request the requesting State must have already collected enough 
information to indicate that fraud exists: differently S. Braum & V. Covolo, ‘European Criminal Law and the Exchange 
of Tax Information: Consequences for Luxembourg’s Bank Secrecy Law’ in: Rust A.& Fort E. (eds.), Exchange of 
Information and Bank Secrecy, 2012, at 47. 
33
 P. Saint-Amans, Europolitics, Internet: <www.europolitics.info> (last visited 24 October 2012). 
34
 P. Malherbe & M. Beynsberger, cit., at 128. 
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information requests may not be declined in cases where a definite assessment of the pertinence of the 
information to an on-going investigation can only be made following the receipt of the information”. 
An inquiry or investigation does not have to strictly correspond to an audit, although the typical case 
will regard an audited taxpayer, and the checking of the corresponding information during the audit.  
According to the OECD, the new expression “foreseeably relevant” is a clarification, but there are 
good arguments to claim that it has a broader meaning than necessity, including because the purpose is 
to extend exchange of information as much as possible, in the context of globalization.
35
  
In contrast, if necessity of information were to be interpreted in very strict terms by the requested 
state, it could be difficult in a concrete case to demonstrate it. The meaning of necessity could mean 
necessity after an audit, necessity because information obtained would lead to a different tax 
assessment or necessity in case an offence occurred and the exact extension of the offence was being 
investigated, necessity in case an additional assessment has occurred in the requesting state and further 
data were sought. 
The wide scope of exchange of information on request finds its ultimate boundary in the 
prohibition of the below-mentioned “fishing expeditions”. But there is a risk that the new expression 
facilitates fishing expeditions and it may be more difficult to determine the boundaries between 
foreseeable relevance and fishing expeditions. Fishing expeditions are defined in the Manual on 
Exchange of Information as “speculative requests for information that have no apparent nexus to an 
open inquiry or investigation”. 
If the taxpayer is identified in a request, the connection between the information sought and the 
taxpayer can be controlled (and all the other elements of the above-mentioned check list also 
contribute to that) and the request will not be speculative. Foreseeable relevance implies “a link to 
taxation with regard to the individual taxpayer, including the fiscal prosecution implementation”36, but 
it can also cover a particular group of taxpayers. In the latter case, exchange of information will serve 
“the administration or enforcement” of domestic tax laws and comply with the requirements of 
paragraph 1, provided it meets the standard of “foreseeable relevance”.37 However, there will be a 
fishing expedition where the request relates to a group of taxpayers not individually identified, the 
requesting state cannot point to an on-going investigation into the affairs of that particular group or 
provide a detailed description of the group and the specific facts and circumstances that have led to the 
request, and other detailed explanation such as the applicable law, why there is reason to believe that 
the taxpayers in the group for whom information is requested have been non-compliant with that law 
supported by a clear factual basis and that the requested information would assist in determining 
compliance by the taxpayers in the group.
38
  
In this context, it is questionable whether the agreement concluded on 19 August, 2009, between 
the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America (US) on a request for legal assistance by the 
US Internal Revenue Service concerning a bank (A) resident in Switzerland (the 09 Agreement) 
39
 
fulfils the aforementioned meaning and limits of foreseeable relevance or whether it is a fishing 
expedition. According to the criteria set out in the annex to the agreement, requests of information by 
the US to Switzerland under the US-Switzerland tax treaty cover the following persons where there is 
                                                     
35
 See no.57 OECD MC comm. on Art. 26.  
36
 T. Schenk-Geers, ‘International Exchange of Information and the Protection of the Taxpayer’ in: R. Seer & I. Gabert 
(eds.) Mutual Assistance and Information Exchange, 2010, at 81. 
37
 No. 5.2. OECD MC Comm.  
38
 No. 5.2. OECD MC; see also Nos. 6 and 8.1 OECD MC. 
39
 Agreement between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on the Request for Information from the 
Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America regarding UBS AG, a corporation established under the laws of 
the Swiss Confederation, Done at Washington, DC 19 August 2009; See M.J. Michaels & M.-T. Yates, ‘The Death of 
Information Exchange Agreements ? (Part Two)’ Journal of International Taxation , 2009, at 56 et seq.  
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a reasonable suspicion of "tax fraud or the like": US-domiciled clients of A. (who directly held and 
beneficially owned undisclosed (non-W-9) custody accounts and banking deposit accounts in excess 
of CHF 1 million at any point in time between 2001 and 2008; and US persons (irrespective of their 
domicile) who beneficially owned offshore company accounts established or maintained between 
2001 and 2008.  
The term "tax fraud or the like" is defined in detail in the agreement. It extends to fraudulent 
conduct (e.g. constructing a scheme of lies or submitting incorrect or false documents) that might 
result in the concealment of assets and the underreporting of income. The direct reason for concluding 
this agreement lay in the fact that the US tax authorities had a data pool of 100 identified US residents 
who maintained undisclosed financial accounts with A and sought identification of any others on the 
grounds that the data pool should be interpreted as meaning an “ascertainable group or category of 
persons” and that it would be applicable to the US-Switzerland tax treaty. Switzerland agreed to 
process the request for legal assistance on the basis of the tax treaty concluded with the US in 1996 
and by means of four categories of situations as defined in the Annex to the 09 Agreement. The 
request concerned an estimated 4,500 current or closed accounts. 
The Swiss Federal Administrative Court, applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), characterized the 09 Agreement as a "Memorandum of Understanding," which may neither 
alter nor amend the tax treaty with the US of 1996. Thus, legal assistance might only be granted if the 
actions falling in the categories set out in the Annex to the 09 Agreement were foreseen in the tax 
treaty itself and did not go beyond it.
40
 Following this ruling, a protocol was signed between the US 
and the Swiss tax administration (approved by the Swiss Federal Council on 31 March 2010) and 
passed by the upper house of the Swiss parliament in December 2011 and by the lower house of the 
Swiss parliament in March 2012).
41
 The Swiss Federal Administrative Court then dismissed the appeal 
against the Federal Tax Administration to grant administrative assistance based on the Agreement of 
19 August 2009 as amended by the mentioned Protocol and accepted that the request by the US 
authorities was not a fishing expedition.  
It is contended here that the terms under the US-Swiss Protocol correspond to the example under 
the OECD MC Commentary 8.1. a), allowing for behavioural-pattern information and go beyond the 
OECD and the Global Forum standard on exchange of information on request. Its Protocol allows for 
behavioural-pattern information exchange requests. It therefore constitutes a fishing expedition 
according to that standard, since the identity of the account holders was unknown as well as the 
account number or similar identifying information or even the name of the financial instruments.  
The issue is whether the forbidden fishing expeditions go beyond the standard or whether they 
violate the standard. If prohibition of fishing expeditions is aimed at protecting the requested tax 
administration, nothing prevents them going beyond the standard. This is the viewpoint of the OECD 
MC Commentaries: According to Commentary 6 introduced on 17 July 2012, “[i]n the examples 
mentioned in paragraph 8.1, and assuming no further information is provided, the contracting states 
are not obligated to provide information in response to a request for information”.  
However, if the standard (i.e. the prohibition of fishing expeditions) aims at protecting taxpayers’ 
rights, there are good reasons to fear that such actions violate the standard, unless those rights are duly 
safeguarded. Under the US-Swiss Protocol, the individuals concerned will arguably be allowed to 
inspect their files upon request, and will also be granted the opportunity to state their case. The rights 
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 Swiss Bundesverwaltungsgericht of 21 January 2010, at m.nos 4.1.1., 4.1.3., 4.2.2.-4.2.4., 4.3, 5-6. 
41
 On 5 March 2012 the lower house of the Swiss parliament amended the resolution ratifying the 2009 protocol to the 
Switzerland-US income tax treaty to simplify the identification of potential tax evaders holding secret Swiss bank 
accounts. The amendment passed 110 to 56, confirming Swiss lawmakers' initial support in a procedural vote taken on 29 
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of these individuals are therefore safeguarded in full. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration will 
decide whether or not assistance will be provided, and will issue a final decision. Upon receipt of this 
decision, the individuals concerned have 30 days in which to lodge an appeal with the Federal 
Administrative Court, which will issue a judicial final decision.
42
 
Where parties bilaterally go beyond the OECD standard and engage in fishing expeditions, it is 
contended here that in such cases exchange of information upon request is moving in the direction of 
automatic exchange of information, risk analysis techniques or tax avoidance or evasion schemes 
(exchange of sensitive information not limited to taxpayer-specific information)
43
, even though in the 
latter case it is exclusively for the requesting State to assess the data. 
This trend can hardly be part of a valid international standard, taking into account that taxpayers’ 
fundamental rights vary greatly among the Members of the Global Forum. There is no guarantee that 
taxpayers’ rights are duly safeguarded, namely that the individuals concerned by a fishing expedition, 
that has been accepted as valid by a requested state, will be allowed to inspect their files upon request 
and granted the opportunity to state their case. 
6.3. Assessment of Validity by a Requested Contracting State 
The risk of violation of taxpayers’ rights in an exchange of information procedure can be also 
illustrated by reference to some relevant case law, according to which it is irrelevant whether or not 
the domestic legislation of the requesting states complies with those rights. For example, information 
requested by a contracting state to the US tax revenue will be granted if the US Powell criteria are met, 
and the US Internal Revenue and courts will not verify how the information will be used in the 
Requesting State: ‘To obtain enforcement of an administrative summons, the US IRS must 
demonstrate that it issued the summons in good faith – i.e., that the investigation will be conducted 
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry will be relevant to the purpose, that the information 
sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required 
by the Code have been followed – in particular, that the [IRS], after investigation, has determined the 
further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing to that effect’. 44  
It results from Powell that a legitimate purpose does not correspond to the merits of the 
investigation, but to the purpose of determining the party’s tax liability.45 It also results from Powell, 
that the legitimacy and good faith of the request should be focused on the requested country: on the 
authority seeking to comply with the request. In the Mazurek case, “Mazurek asserted that under 
French law the [French Tax Authorities] could not continue its investigation until a final decision on 
his residency status is made, arguing that it would therefore be improper for the IRS to provide his 
financial information to the FTA at this time”. The US Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit did not find 
this argument relevant.
 46
 The Powell criteria exclude an assessment on the legitimacy of the request 
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 S.S. Johnston, Swiss Parliament Amends Protocol to Treaty With U.S., Tax Analysts, 7 March 2012. 
43
 See No. 5.1. OECD MC Comm. on Art.26. 
44
 U.S. Supreme Court of 23 November 1964, United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 14 AFTR2d 5942 (1964); US 
District Court for District of Hawaii of 21 May 1997, Docket n.º 86-1135, Alliance Acceptance Corp Inc v. US; US 
District Court for Northern District of California of 28 April 1997, Docket n.º C-97-0029 TEH, 79 AFTR 2d 97-2702, 
William J. Fitzmaurice v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; US District Court for Central District of California of 5 
February 1999; US District Court for Central District of California of 13 November 2000, Docket n.º CV 00-06975 
(BQRx), Yeong Yae Yun v. U.S.; US Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit of 7 November 2001; US District Court for 
Western District of Texas of 5 January 2007, Docket n.º 3:06-cv-00411, Bull D S.A. de C.V. v. U.S. 
45
 US District Court for Southern District of New York 29 November 1995, Fernandez-Marinelli v. U.S. 
46
 US courts ‘determine whether the government has demonstrated a prima facie case by fulfilling the four factors 
delineated in Powell. The burden on the government to produce a prima facie case is “slight” or “minimal”. Next, if the 
government meets its burden [the courts] assess whether the opponent of the summons fulfils his “heavy burden” of 
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by the requesting state and it is therefore disputable whether this interpretation fulfils the meaning of 
foreseeable relevance and corresponding taxpayers’ rights.47 
In another US case, the US District Court for District of Arizona “[t]he US District Court stated 
that the inquiry was not whether the Mexican tax authorities were acting in good faith but whether the 
conditions stipulated by the US Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 
(1989) had been met”48 : in this case the taxpayer objected to the tax investigation in Mexico on the 
basis that it was time-barred by the statute of limitations and the Mexican court agreed with the 
taxpayer and issued a permanent injunction on 16 August 2000 suspending the tax audit and 
prohibiting the Mexican tax authorities from taking any further action. Subsequently, the taxpayer 
filed a motion in the US District Court for the District of Arizona to have the IRS summons quashed 
but the US court did not apply the Powell criteria to the requesting state and considered they were 
fulfilled in the US. 
It is therefore herein assumed that information will be often granted by a requested state without 
verifying how it will be used by the requesting state. Once the information is granted, disclosure 
limited to certain persons and entities described in Article 26 para. 2 OECD MC, and confidentiality 
according to a non-discrimination principle under the same para. 2, constitute the only limits to the use 
of that information by the requesting state. It is for the taxpayer to use any other international tools, 
e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights, in order to argue infringement of the rule of law, 
such as the privilege against self-incrimination or in the case of confiscatory taxes.
49
  
The privilege against self-incrimination will only protect the taxpayer in the requesting state, once 
this state obtains the relevant information. That privilege will not apply to the vast majority of the 
information requests seeking to obtain information from third parties such as banks, intermediaries or 
other contracting parties and not from the individual under investigation. And even if the requesting 
state may consider banks as accomplices to the crimes involved in the tax evasion, it has to be checked 
whether the privilege only protects natural persons or also juridical persons.
50
 
The requested state can deny provision of information if the reasons for requesting it infringe the 
rule of law and this has been done previously. The Swiss federal court rejected a request for exchange 
(Contd.)                                                                  
rebutting the proponent’s case either by undermining the proponent’s contentions regarding any of the Powell factors or 
by demonstrating that enforcement of the summons would result in an “abuse” of the court’s process’. The summons 
would constitute an abuse of the judicial process if it were ‘used to harass, to gain leverage, or pretextually to develop a 
criminal investigation’: US Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit, of 7 November 2001, Zbigniew Emilian Mazurek v. U.S; 
see also a U.S. case involving an exempted taxpayer (charitable private Foundation): according to the U.S. court , “in 
order to enforce the summonses…this Court is not required to find that Banyan Tree Foundation is liable for income tax 
liability under the Income Tax Act of Canada”: US District Court for Southern District California, of 2 October 2007, 
Paul N. Hiley Pnh Financial Inc.  
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 See US District Court for District of Arizona, of 5 December 2000, Docket n.º CIV 00-381, 86 AFTR 2d 2000-7356, 
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 See US District Court for District of Arizona, of 5 December 2000, Docket n.º CIV 00-381, 86 AFTR 2d 2000-7356, 
Francisco Alatorre Urtuzuastegui v. U.S.; The case was confirmed: US District Court for District of Arizona, of 9 
January 2001, Docket n.º CIV 00-381, 87 AFTR2 d (RIA) 2001-489, Francisco Alatorre Urtuzuastegui v. U.S. 
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 See ECtHR, judgment of 31 May 2011, case of Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (Application No. 5829/04); ECtHR, pending 
Application No. 11082/06 by Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovskiy against Russia, lodged on 16 March 2006; See the 
comments on these cases and on the Yukos case in: P. Malherbe P. & M. Beynsberger, cit., at 126.  
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of information for criminal purposes in the Yukos case on the basis that the information would be used 
for political persecution: ‘The totality of these elements bears out the suspicion that the penal 
procedure was therefore used for the purposes of the established power, in order to go after the class of 
rich ‘oligarchs’ and to push aside potential or declared political adversaries. It follows that Mutual 
Assistance cannot be granted …’ 51. However, the interpretation adopted by the Swiss federal court is 
not required by the current international standard. 
Procedural rights and safeguards for taxpayers are not guaranteed by the international standard 
either, even if some contracting states include them in their domestic laws, for example, where the 
taxpayers’ rights and safeguards are affected by tax investigation procedures, audits, information-
gathering measures or information exchange. Such rights and safeguards usually include notification 
rules, consultation rights and intervention rights. The latter may include a right to challenge the 
exchange of information following notification or rights to challenge information-gathering measures 
taken by the requested party.
52
 In case there is a suspicion of tax fraud or a serious risk that 
notification will affect the collection of taxes due in the requesting state, the latter should indicate 
those suspicions to the requested State.  
The OECD Manual recommends that contracting parties inform each other of their legislation or 
administrative practice concerning notification (paras. 54-55), but there is no obligation to do so. In 
the European Union, notification rights no longer apply in VAT cases of exchange between Member 
States of the European Union, but the context is different from the worldwide context and bilateral 
relations between states that do not share harmonized legislation and common institutions. In any case, 
even within the European Union, the legal protection of the taxpayer can be jeopardized: in respect of 
direct taxes, incoming requests are higher than when a EU Member State wants to make a request. In 
fact, few EU Member States provide for a notification right in case they intend to make a request and 
the taxpayer has nearly no rights to bar those requests.
53
 
6.4. Confidentiality  
Disclosure of information by one contracting state to another contracting state implies that the latter 
treats the information received as secret (Article 26 para. 2 OECD MC and Article 8 Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information). However, the confidentiality limit in the OECD MC does 
not grant the necessary protection to the taxpayer either, because the current standard (dating back to 
the OECD MC of 1977) cross-refers to domestic law and therefore only assures a non-discrimination 
or equivalence principle: the contracting state must treat the information obtained by the other 
contracting state in the same manner as it treats it domestically. The equivalence principle implies that 
different procedural rules and different levels of protection will be applicable in the various 
contracting states, within the framework of the MC limits.
54
 
Under the OECD MC 1963 secrecy was a treaty obligation to be interpreted autonomously from 
domestic law, and requiring an absolute protection.
55
 According to the 1963 version of Article 26 para. 
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2: ‘Any information so exchanged shall be treated as secret and shall not be disclosed to any persons 
or authorities other than those concerned with the assessment or collection of the taxes which are the 
subject of the Convention’. 
The current cross-reference to domestic law is not complete, since the MC includes parameters of 
secrecy, namely those regarding the persons to whom information may be disclosed and the purposes 
for which it may be used: the information can only be disclosed to a certain group of persons and used 
for purposes of assessment or collection of taxes under para.1, and for the enforcement or prosecution 
or the determination of appeals regarding the mentioned taxes (the purpose limitation principle).
56
  
The 2012 amendment to paragraph 2 allows the contracting states to share information received for 
purposes in addition to tax purposes, provided two conditions are met: first, the information may be 
used for other purposes under the laws of both states (e.g. in case of a non-fiscal crime, a treaty 
concerning judicial assistance); and, second, the competent authority of the supplying state authorizes 
such use (see commentary 12.3). If the supply of information does not respect the confidentiality 
limits, the requested state can refuse to supply that information and in that manner it is protecting the 
interests of the taxpayer. The supplying state therefore has a duty of care to protect the taxpayer’s 
interest. However that decision is discretionary and there is no guarantee that the requested state will 
refuse that supply. The taxpayer’s position under this duty of secrecy by the requesting state is not 
sufficiently protected.
57
 
On the contrary, under Article 8 Model Agreement on Exchange of Information, confidentiality is a 
treaty obligation to be interpreted autonomously from domestic law, and requiring an absolute 
protection
58
, and if any breach of confidentiality is a treaty breach, it is not clear what the 
consequences or sanctions will be in the case of breach. 
Some treaties or protocols clarify this topic and are best practices to be followed by other 
contracting states.  
For example, protocols to TIEAs signed by Germany, namely the Protocol to the Agreement 
between Germany and Jersey, ensure the protection of personal data at a level that is equivalent to that 
of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. Another example is the second Protocol to the Austria-Canada tax treaty, which includes a 
paragraph on this issue and provides that unauthorized disclosure of information received from a 
contracting party is a criminal offence in the recipient State: “Where information is exchanged is 
subject to strict confidentiality rules. It is expressly provided in Article 26 that information 
communicated shall be treated as secret. It can only be used for the purposes provided for in the 
convention. Sanctions for the violation of such secrecy are governed by administrative and penal laws 
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in all states. Typically, unauthorized disclosure of tax related information received from another 
country is a criminal offence punishable by a jail sentence”. 
If the requested state has grounds to suspect that the requesting state will not respect confidentiality 
of the information provided, namely because in previous exchange of information situations it has not 
respected confidentiality or because its domestic legislation does not respect it, sanctions can be 
applicable in the requested state that provided the information, but this is not guaranteed: See the Aloe 
Vera of America case.
 59
 
6.5. Other Limits 
A right to refuse a request for information beyond the conditions and limits laid down in Article 26 
results from the general principles of international public law (Article 60 VCLT), in particular, in 
cases where there are grounds to believe that secrecy of the information as required under para. 2 will 
not be respected or that the information will be misused.
60
 Moreover, if one of the conditions in Article 
26 (3) is satisfied, there is no obligation to supply information and hence no obligation to make 
investigations under the tax treaty. 
61
 
If all conditions for exchanging information are fulfilled, the requested State has to provide the 
information to the requesting State.” Information obtainable” by the requested tax administration is the 
information that is in the possession of the authorities or that can be obtained by any investigative 
procedures as foreseen in its domestic law (OECD MC Commentary 16). The contracting state is not 
obliged under treaty law to obtain information illegally but it is disputable whether it can use 
information obtained in that way. Moreover, it is debatable whether information obtained illicitly can 
be validly used. Article 26 OECD MC does not contain any prohibition in this respect, as long as the 
confidentiality limits are respected, and a prohibition of use being made of such evidence in the 
requesting contracting state depends on the latter state’s domestic law62.  
7. Concluding Remarks: a Step-by-step Approach and Transitional Regimes 
It results from the previous pages that validity of an international standard implies that the taxpayers’ 
fundamental rights are respected in the legal systems using the standard. The examples analysed in this 
paper correspond to some of the conditions that should be verified in an exchange of information 
procedure complying with the rule of law: the existence of foreseeable relevance of the request and 
corresponding prohibition of fishing expeditions; compliance with the statute of limitations; 
confidentiality; non-use of illicitly obtained data. But these conditions are either not required by the 
standard or can be easily misapplied. Moreover, the contracting States have their own judicial 
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instances and there is no binding supranational case law enacted by a supranational independent court 
that will interpret the standard according to the rule of law and in a uniform manner.  
Exchange of information on request as an international standard still has serious fragilities and 
therefore can hardly be validly proposed as a universal standard. It should instead take into account the 
legal system and the taxpayers’ rights of each and every Member of the Global Forum and 
consequently be adapted if necessary (it should require that the conditions related to the rule of law are 
effectively foreseen, respected and subject to peer review) or replaced by another mechanism fulfilling 
the same purpose (preventing and combating tax evasion). The virtues of exchange of information in 
combating tax evasion were discussed at the European Union level, in the late nineties, in respect of 
taxation of interest from savings. The first version of the proposal provided the Member States an 
option between (automatic) exchange of information and a withholding tax at source. In June 2000, 
exchange of information became the rule and the withholding tax could only be adopted exceptionally 
by those Member States with bank secrecy, specially authorized in the Directive, and during a 
transitional period.
63
 Even if exchange of information is a best practice, compliant with the virtues of 
transparency, it is herein contended that the Global Forum could instead adopt a step-by-step 
approach, and for example require withholding taxes at source in respect of passive income by those 
Member States that do not fulfil the aforementioned conditions of a rule-of-law state, including 
taxpayers’ fundamental rights combined with specific anti abuse provisions applied by the residence 
countries, such as those suggested in the OECD Report of 1998. Transition to exchange of information 
would then be achieved progressively and by a peer-review process. 
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